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The yearly mounting toll of deaths and injuries resulting
from automobile accidents in the United States has been the
source of considerable agitation for more drastic regulation of
motor vehicles when operated on the public highways. Under
their so-called police powers, several states have enacted legisla-
tion to safeguard the rights of the victims of such accidents and
to provide convenient means for their enforcement. In 1923,
Massachusetts passed a law declaring that the use of the state's
highways by a non-resident motorist shall be deemed equivalent
to an appointment by him of the registrar of motor vehicles as his
attorney, upon whom process may be served in any action grow-
ing out of any accident or collision in which the non-resident
motorist may be involved while operating a motor vehicle upon
such highways.' Service of a copy of the process upon the de-
fendant is required to be made by registered mail. The Massa-
chusetts Act, recently upheld by the United States Supreme
Court 2 as a reasonable exercise of the police power, was fol-
lowed by similar measures in Connecticut, New Hampshire, New
Jersey and Wisconsin.3
In line with these provisions, designed to give a convenient
means of redress, there is a growing demand for measures to
insure that the remedy afforded shall be of some value. When
one considers that more than twice as many people were killed
or injured in the United States by automobiles in 1926 as there
'MASS. Cum. STAT. (1927) C. 90 §3A.
2Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (927).
'CONN. PUB. AcTs (1925) c. I22; N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. I00 §32;
Wis. LAWS (1925) C. 94; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Cum. SuPP. 1924) § 135-93
(held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Wuchter v.
Pizzuti, decided Feb. 20, 1928, on the ground that its failure to require notice
to the defendant was a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteeenth
Amendment).
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were Americans killed or wounded in the Great War, the tre-
mendous economic loss involved becomes evident. The deaths
alone are now in excess of twenty-five thousand per year and
with the prospect of an increasing number of cars in operation,
it is not unreasonable to assume that the number of casualties
will continue to be as large if not larger than at the present.
The remedy now most often suggested is a compulsory
automobile liability insurance law. It is estimated that not more
than twenty percent. of automobile owners in the United States
carry liability insurance. A recent survey in New York shows
that only seventeen per cent. of the registered cars are insured in
that state. The percentage is higher, of course, in the cities than
in the country districts. But even in the very large cities with a
population exceeding five hundred thousand, probably not more
than fifty per cent. of the owners are insured. The person who
does not carry insurance is the irresponsible automobile owner
of the judgment-proof sort, and instances of persons who have
sustained serious injuries and obtained judgments against de-
fendants afflicted with chronic insolvency are no longer rare. It
has been estimated that one-fourth of all injured claimants en-
titled by law to collect fail on account of the defendant's financial
irresponsibility. 4 Possibly this estimate is high, but it must be
conceded that the number of such persons is large, and that their
inability to collect is a matter of public concern.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the validity of com-
pulsory liability insurance legislation and some possible effects
of it, and to suggest the adoption of an alternative measure, bas-
ing the right to recovery on compensation, irrespective of the
proof of negligence.
In i9z5, Massachusetts passed a compulsory liability insur-
ance act, it being the first measure of its kind in the country.5
A legislative committee, appointed to study motor vehicle prob-
lems, had reported that more than twenty thousand persons per
"See Compulsory Automobile Insurance, by Harry J. Loman, Professor
of Insurance, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Penn-
sylvania, in the ANNALS OF THE AmEmCAN ACADE Y OF POLncAL AND SocrAL
ScENcE, March, 1927.
'MASS. CUM. STAT. (1927) C. 175 § I13A.
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year were killed or injured by motor vehicles in Massachusetts,
that owners of only about thirty per cent. of the registered auto-
mobiles carried insurance, and that large numbers of persons
injured and representatives of those killed were unable to obtain
redress because of the financial irresponsibility of defendants in
suits arising out of such accidents. The Massachusetts Act, in
brief, requires that every applicant for registration of a motor
vehicle must present a certificate showing that his motor vehicle
is covered by a liability bond or an insurance policy, which runs
for a period coterminous with the registration, and provides in-
demnities against loss to the insured and to any person operating
or responsible for the operation of the vehicle with his express or
implied consent, to the amount of five thousand dollars, on ac-
count of injury to or death of any one person, and in the sum of
ten thousand dollars, on account of injury to or death of more
than one person in any one accident. In lieu of a bond or policy
an applicant may deposit cash or securities with the state in the
sum of five thousand dollars.
Prior to the final enactment of this measure, the Supreme
Judicial Court, at the request of the legislature, rendered an ad-
visory opinion in which it passed upon its constitutionality, and
upheld it in every particular.6 The court found ample support
for its opinion in the broad powers of the Commonwealth to
regulate travel on the highways in the public interest, and while
admitting that the proposed ban would extend the police power
into a new field, it found established precedents in the familiar
dangerous instrumentality doctrine, as well as compulsory work-
men's compensation acts.
The Act does not apply to non-resident owners not regis-
tered in Massachusetts, but the court felt that a classification in-
cluding only such motor vehicles as were registered was not un-
reasonable, although the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
expressed serious doubt as to the validity of a similar provision in
a bill pending before the legislature of that state. 7 While the
Iln Re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 (1925).
'Re Opinion of the Justices, 8i N. H. 566, 129 AtI. 117, 39 A. L. R. io23
(1925).
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Act might well have included non-resident owners,s the distinc-
tion created does not appear to amount to unlawful discrimina-
tion. It is not necessary that both classes be treated exactly alike.
Laws permitting non-resident owners to operate within a state
without being registered or obtaining a license are admittedly
valid. Motor vehicles owned by the Commonwealth or by street
railways under public control are also excluded from the Act.
Nor are claims for personal injury or death occurring on private
property and claims for property damage provided for.
The Act provides for a board of appeal, before which a
person aggrieved by the cancellation of his bond or policy or by
the refusal of a surety company or insurance company to issue
the same, may appear; and the board shall determine whether or
not the cancellation is proper and whether or not the applicant is
a proper risk. In sustaining this section of the Act the court
recognized it was a serious interference with the insurer's *right
to freedom of contract. Inasmuch as corporations alone can
issue either a policy or bond under the terms of the Act, the
power of the state over corporations in general, and insurance
corporations in particular, was invoked to justify it. No state-
ments made by or on behalf of the insured and no violations of
the terms of the policy are allowed to defeat the claim of a
judgment creditor proceeding to collect damages. This provision,
in effect, abolishes the defense of fraud by the insurer or surety
in so far as the injured claimant is concerned, but power is re-
served in the company to cancel the policy or bond on reasonable
notice, the cancellation being subject to review by the board of
appeal.
As regards the operation of the Massachusetts law no sta-
tistics are available, so far as we are aware, showing its effect
upon the number of accidents, the proportion of judgments ob-
tained in suits instituted, or the average amount of such judg-
ments. There is no doubt, however, as to the hostility of insur-
ance companies toward it. Whether or not their interests are as
seriously jeopardized by the Act as they claim, remains to be seen.
'Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 16o (igi6) ; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235
U. S. 61o (ig95).
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The power placed in the hands of the board of appeal to pass
upon the fitness of applicants may be effectual in removing many
reckless drivers from the highways and in checking the increase
in the number of accidents. On the other hand, juries will neces-
sarily know that all defendants are insured, and will be more
prone to resolve doubts in favor of plaintiffs. It is not our
purpose here to state all the possible arguments that may be urged
for and against the law from the standpoint of the insurance
companies. Until the facts have been collected and analyzed it is,
perhaps, better to withhold judgment.
Meanwhile another type of law, not requiring insurance, but
designed to provide some relief to injured claimants, was passed
in New Hampshire in i927.' This Act provides for a prelimi-
nary court hearing upon the petition of an injured party at which
time, if the court is of the opinion that the accident was probably
due to defendant's fault, it shall order him to furnish such se-
curity as it may see fit to satisfy a judgment against him. If
the defendant fails to obtain the security, his license and regis-
tration are suspended. The most obvious objection to legisla-
tion of this sort is that it locks the stable door after the horse
is stolen. If defendant is financially irresponsible, the necessary
security will not be forthcoming. Another serious objection to
it, certainly in large cities, would be the crowding of court dockets
already overloaded with such cases.
It may seriously be questioned whether the automobile has
not created a condition that demands treatment radically dif-
ferent from that embodied in compulsory liability insurance laws.
Admitting that such measures are enacted in pursuance of the
police power of the state, cannot and should not that power be
exercised to provide redress for all persons injured in automobile
accidents? A law providing compensation for injuries sustained,
analogous to workmen's compensation acts now in force, would,
it is believed, accomplish this result.
Before inquiring into the constitutionality of a law as above
proposed, it is well to see how the existing legal machinery func-
tions. Generally speaking, the right of an injured party to re-
IN. H. LAWS (1927) c. 54.
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cover depends upon proof of the defendant's negligence and
proof of plaintiff's own freedom from contributory negligence,
and he must establish these facts by a fair preponderance of the
evidence. The law provides a standard of care by which his con-
duct is judged, which standard is that of a purely fictitious fel-
low, sometimes known as the "reasonably prudent man." Admit-
tedly he behaves like none of the human race, for his qualities
are not those of the ordinary person, who at one time or
another is pretty certain to err. How do such rules apply to auto-
mobile accidents? Conceding that responsibility in many cases
can be clearly traced to one of the parties, it is still true that in
many more cases circumstances beyond the control of both par-
ties are the real causes, and only by invoking an artificial stand-
ard of conduct can negligence be attributed to either. If the
standard by which the conduct of the parties is judged is arti-
ficial, the facts in so far as the jury hear them are usually equally
so. Accidents occur and are over in a flash. Years afterward
witnesses come into court to teftify from memories clouded by
the lapse of time. Even though their memories are fresh, the
difficulty is that they do not know what really happened. One
attempting to visualize the action from such testimony conceives
a jumbled mass of moving vehicles, street curbs, car tracks,
distances and miles per hour, and gives up in despair. All too
frequently it happens that the only evidence which might estab-
lish negligence lies buried with the victim. For the rule generally
is that there is no presumption in law that a decedent was in the
exercise of due care at the time of his death.
It may be argued, of course, that all the rules pertaining to
the proof of negligence and due care have been an essential part
of the law from the beginning, and that instances of cases wherein
the rules work hardship do not warrant their abandonment.
However, it should be remembered that the present condition of
affairs has been brought about by the automobile. It has revo-
lutionized ways of living and necessitated changes in long-estab-
lished habits, so that eternal vigilance is the price of safety to all
users of the highway today. Just as society has required modern
industry to assume its share of responsibility for its victims, by
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the passage of workmen's compensation acts, likewise it seems
not unreasonable to believe that legislation providing some form
of compensation for those injured on the highway by automobiles
will be enacted.
It is not within the scope of this article to discuss in detail
the nature of such legislation, but merely to consider certain of
the most important objections which may be made on constitu-
tional grounds, to point out its major requirements, and to note
certain obstacles in its path. It is, of course, impossible to con-
sider individually the many provisions found in the constitutions
of the respective states which might be invoked in an attack upon
the validity of such legislation. It must suffice, therefore, to
consider the possible objections under the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution and the Federal Constitution, in the hope that this may
point the way to the solution of objections based upon provisions
of other constitutions more or less similar.
Only two sections of the Constitution of Pennsylvania pre-
sent real difficulty: Article I, section 6,10 and Article III, section
21.11 These were urged as objections to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act 12 in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, by a
workman who, although injured subsequently to the effective
day of that statute, sought to maintain an action against his em-
ployer at common law. In that case, 3 the Court held that the
"0"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain
inviolate."
"As amended Nov. 2, 1915: "The General Assembly may enact laws re-
quiring the payment by employers, or employers and employes jointly, of reason-
able compensation for injuries to employes arising in the course of their em-
ployment, and for occupation diseases of employes, whether or not such injuries
or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault of employer or employe, and
fixing the basis of ascertainment of such compensation and the maximum and
minimum limits thereof, and providing special or general remedies for the collec-
tion thereof; but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount
to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or
property, and in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall sur-
vive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions
shall be prosecuted. No act shall prescribe any limitations of time within
which suits may be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or
property, or for other causes, different from those fixed by general laws regu-
lating actions against natural persons, and such acts now existing are avoided.
"Act of I915, P. L. 736, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 2iI916 et seq.
"Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33, 99 At. 215 (i916). This case
arose prior to the amendment of 1915 to Article III,§ 21 of the Constitution,
which is quoted supra note ii, and there, as here, only the general prohibition
contained in that section was under consideration.
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optional feature of the Workmen's Compensation Act was a
complete answer to the argument that it violated the provisions
of the Constitution referred to. In other words, the parties were
deprived of a trial by jury, and the amount of recovery was
limited, only when the parties had agreed that such should be
the case. It was nowhere stated in that opinion that the Act
would have been void but for the option given, but that result
would seem' to follow from the language of earlier decisions.
14
It is possible, however, that the remedy provided by an act such
as that under consideration might be held to be novel, and not
within the constitutional restrictions referred to. This is more
likely in regard to the requirement of trial by jury, as to which
analogies may be found,15 than as to limitation of recovery, since
the language of the latter clause is far broader.
While there remains always the possibility of constitutional
amendment, 16 it does not seem necessary.to resort to that measure
in order to achieve the desired end. One possible alternative
would be to make this remedy optional with the person injured,
so as to avoid constitutional objections on the same ground as
that on which the Workmen's Compensation Act was sustained.
17
While an election prior to the accident, as is the practice under
that Act, could not be required, except as mentioned later, such
obstacles could be placed in the way of recovery in an action at
common law as would prove nearly as effective.18  In addition,
" Cutler & Hinds v. Richley, ISI Pa. 195, 25 At. 96 (1892) ; Pennsylvania
R. R. v. Bowers, 124 Pa. 183, i6 AtI. 836 (i889), and cases there cited. For
further decisions on this point, see I PuRn. DIG. (03th ed. 1905) 118, n. (m),(n), 119, n. (o).
"That the claim of the defendant below was derived from and altogether
dependent upon statutory enactment is a sufficient answer to the argument that
the Act of Assembly . . . is unconstitutional as depriving the defendant of
his right to a trial by jury; Simpson v. Neill, 89 Pa. 183, i86 (1879). See
also Wynkoop v. Cooch, 89 Pa. 45o (879) ; Rhines v. Clark, 5i Pa. 96 (I866) ;
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 24 Pa. Super. 57I (904); Premier Cereal Co. v.
Pennsylvania Alcohol Permit Board, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, de-
cided Jan. 23, 1928, not yet reported. For further decisions, see cases collected
in I Pumn. DIG. (13th ed. 19o5) 118, n. (n), iig n. (o).
"This would not present any serious obstacle, especially in view of the
precedent already established by the Amendment of I9M5, providing for work-
men's compensation laws. See this section as amended, supra note ii.
"Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., supra note I3.
"' Possible changes in the present law of negligence to make the remedy less
attractive are almost countless. Among the most obvious are the requirement
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an affirmative notice of election to sue at common law, to be
served personally upon the defendant, within a limited period of
time, might be required.
There would seem to be but little difficulty on the constitu-
tional side, so far as objection by the defendant is concerned.
Consent to be bound by this legislation might be made a condi-
tion of securing registration for an automobile. In view of
recent decisions, 19 especially those of the Supreme Court of the
United States,20 this requirement certainly would not place an
unconstitutional burden upon one desiring to avail himself of
the privilege of operating an automobile upon the public highway.
As a further development of this right to operate an automobile,
every applicant for a driver's license might be required to consent
to be bound by the act under consideration as to any injuries sus-
tained by him while operating a car upon the highway.
The Federal Constitution interposes no objection to such a
compensatory plan. It is clear from the language of the case
just cited 21 that legislation regulatory of motor, vehicles and
their operation stands in a class by itself, by reason of the con-
stant danger to life and property which is involved. It seems,
therefore, that the language used by the Supreme Court of the
United States in passing upon the constitutionality of the Work-
men's Compensation Act of New York 22 is fully applicable in
the situation under consideration:
that the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving not only the defendant's
negligence but also his own freedom from contributory negligence; imputation
to the plaintiff of the negligence of the driver of the vehicle in which he is
riding; denial of recovery whenever the plaintiff or such driver is guilty of any
violation of law, whether or not a contributing cause of the accident; denial
of recovery to a pedestrian who crosses a street at a place other than on the
crosswalk, or while any vehicle is approaching within sight; denial of recovery
to any occupant of a vehicle which fails to come to a stop before entering an
intersection; requiring the plaintiff to specify precisely and in detail the act
of negligence of the defendant on which he relies for recovery, and to establish
such act by evidence of the same grade and quality as that which would be re-
quired for conviction upon a criminal prosecution for the same acts. Other
changes looking toward the same end will doubtless suggest themselves to the
reader.
See cases collected in 42 C. J. 614 et seq.
"Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 2. Cf. Kane v. New Jersey, Hendrick v.
Maryland, both supra note 8.
"Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 2.
"New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 206 (1917).
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"The subject-matter, in respect of which freedom of
contract is restricted, is the matter of compensation for
human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the course
of hazardous employment, and the public has a direct in-
terest in this as affecting the common welfare."
And in the other case decided at the same time,23 it was added:
"It seems to us that the considerations to which we have
adverted in New York C. R. Co. v. White, supra, as show-
ing that the Workmen's Compensation Law of New York
is not to be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable from the
standpoint of natural justice, are sufficient to support the
state of Washington in concluding that the matter of com-
pensation for accidental injuries with resulting loss of life
or earning capacity of men employed in hazardous occupa-
tions is of sufficient public moment to justify making the
entire matter of compensation a public concern, to be ad-
ministered through state agencies. Certainly the operation
of industrial establishments that, in the ordinary course of
things, frequently and inevitably produce disabling or mortal
injuries to the human beings employed, is not a matter of
wholly private concern."
Taking these pronouncements, together with that in Hess v.
Pawloski, that "Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and
even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended
by serious damages to persons and property," scant doubt can
remain of the attitude of that Court toward such a scheme of
compensation, when the question shall be presented to it.
We come, therefore, to a consideration of the essential fea-
tures of such an act. The necessity and advisability of making it
elective in form, and the changes necessary in the common law
remedy in that event have already been considered, and will not
be further referred to. The scope of the act should be broad
enough to include compensation for all personal injuries sus-
tained, whether by a pedestrian, a driver or passenger in an auto-
mobile or other vehicle, in consequence of impact between auto-
mobile and pedestrian or between automobiles or between an
automobile and another vehicle of any sort, on the highway.
'Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 239 (1917).
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Injuries sustained in collisions with street railway cars might be
included in the compensable class. But collisions between auto-
mobile and railway trains or interurban electric railroads should
not be included. Injuries sustained by passengers in an auto-
mobile by reason of an accident in which no other vehicle is in-
volved should be compensated for, but under such circumstances
the driver would be left to his existing remedies at law. These
are, of course, no more than tentative suggestions as to the most
feasible scope of such an enactment, and experience might show
it to be either too broad or too restricted. Grade crossing acci-
dents are not within the purpose of such an act, it seems to the
present writers, since the primary cause of such accidents is not
the automobile-witness the number of injuries sustained under
similar circumstances long before the advent of the "horseless
carriage." Provisions similar to those found in most workmen's
compensation acts should be incorporated into this act, excluding
from its operation injuries caused by the wilful intention of the
injured person to injure himself or another, or by his intoxi-
cation.
Regardless of whether or not any election is to be given to a
person 'injured under conditions making the act applicable, it
would necessarily be a part of such legislation that the filing of a
petition under it operate as a waiver of any other rights which
the injured person may have, unless it appear upon the hearing
of the petition that he is not within the scope of the compensatory
act; otherwise, the election thus evidenced to be binding upon the
injured party, and his heirs and representatives as well.
Where the person liable for payment of compensation under
such an act is also the employer liable under a workmen's com-
pensation act, the provisions of the latter should apply. Where,
however, the injured person is within the provisions of both acts
and the person liable for payment under each is not the same, the
injured may elect under which he will proceed, not being entitled
to the benefits of both.
In regard to the amount of compensation payable under
such an act, the most feasible plan appears to be the establish-
ment of a fixed weekly sum as compensation for total disability,
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and of a proportionately smaller amount for partial disability.
These would be in the nature of a minimum allowance, payable
to every person injured under circumstances invoking the appli-
cation of the statute, without regard to actual loss incurred. In
addition to this fixed sum, the reasonable expenses for medical,
surgical and hospital services incurred by the claimant should be
allowed, with the possible limitation mentioned below. If a claim-
ant sought to recover any greater sum, however, he would be
required to assume the burden of proving actual loss of earnings
or of profits in the sum claimed, and such greater award, if made,
would, of course, be in lieu of, rather than in addition to, the
minimum payment discussed above.
This plan would, it is submitted, provide with equal justice
for those not employed in gainful occupations, those earning large
or small salaries, and those carrying on business individually
or in a copartnership, who have experienced great difficulty in
actions at common law in proving loss of earnings. Pain and
suffering, it will be noticed, have been disallowed altogether as
an element of compensation. Further reference will be made to
this later, and it is sufficient at this point to remark that any
practitioner knows what an elastic and elusive element this may
become in the hands of a jury. Since the difficulty would be
nearly as great under an act of the nature under consideration, it
has seemed best to eliminate this unstable factor.
Whether or not an ,injured person should be required to
accept medical service tendered by the defendant, as is often pro-
vided in workmen's compensation acts, is disputable. It is per-
fectly obvious that many persons would refuse to be attended by
a physician unknown to them, and for this reason it seems dis-
tinctly unjust to refuse to such persons reasonable medical ex-
penses actually incurred. In any event, prompt notice of injury
and prompt submission to medical examination on behalf of the
person liable to pay compensation should be made mandatory, on
penalty of disallowance of the claim. The other provisons of
the local workmen's compensation acts, such as definition of total
disability, dependents entitled to compensation, maximum period
of compensation, partial permanent disability, and the other de-
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tails, might be embodied in the act under consideration without
substantial change.
The machinery necessary to carry into effect this act would
not differ essentially from that now existing under the work-
men's compensation acts, and no discussion of this phase of the
problem seems necessary.
Insurance against such liability should be made mandatory,
but whether it should be left to private corporations, be provided
for by the state, or both systems maintained, with perhaps the
additional feature of self-insurers (under proper restrictions and
safeguards) as under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, is largely a matter of policy and of local preference.
This is not a problem peculiar to such an act as this, and no doubt
the established precedent under the workmen's compensation
laws would be followed in any given jurisdiction.
A system of reports to the state department of all accidents
occurring, similar to that provided for by the Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Act, would no doubt be a desirable
feature of the act, not only for statistical purposes, but in order
to maintain a record of each driver and of each automobile.
Some scheme of blacklisting and refusal of a license to one who
reported an excessive number of accidents, or who. failed to re-
port any accident in which he or his automobile was to his knowl-
edge involved, might be added in this connection.
Another problem not yet mentioned is that of liability for
property damage. It is obvious that there is not here the same
public interest in securing compensation irrespective of fault as
exists in the case of personal injuries. Yet to leave these cases
to the ordinary procedure of the courts would defeat one of the
great aims to be achieved by the act in question, leaving the courts
harassed with a large mass of accident litigation, and would re-
quire double litigation in a large proportion of cases. The most
satisfactory solution would appear to be to utilize the machinery
created for the personal injury cases, but to make recovery de-
pendent upon the same elements as are now required, leaving
the whole body of the law in that regard unchanged.
This is, of course, a mere summary of the main features of
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an act necessary to secure compensation to those injured by the
operation of automobiles, and necessariiy omits many phases
of the subject altogether. It is indisputable, further, that many
objections may be urged against such a plan from an economic
and social standpoint, but it is believed that they are far out-
weighed by the advantages to be gained. At first glance; it may
seem that a person injured by an automobile is denied much of
his remedy under this plan, but the writers are confident that the
remedy actually available would prove much more, satisfactory
than the present one. The remedy held out by the common law
has proven on countless occasions to be a will-o'-the-wisp, seek-
ing which the luckless victim has plunged deep into the bog
and mire of legal technicalities. If he does not convict himself of
contributory negligence by his own version of the accident, he is
apt to discover that he is unable to prove some important element
of the loss which he has sustained. Even if he obtains a verdict,
it is often a year or more before he sees the fruits of his victory,
and, as previously pointed out, there are all too many instances
in which he never receives it, the defendant having proven insol-
vent. And, for one reason or another, it is rarely indeed that he
will secure the sum to which the jury declared him entitled.
Another phase of the problem as it now exists, of equal
interest to the plaintiff and to the community at large, is the delay
in the courts attributable in large measure, if not solely, to the
flood of suits arising out of injuries sustained in automobile acci-
dents. This is a matter of public concern, because not only the
injured person is without remedy for two or three years, but
because other litigation is delayed for the same period of time,
with consequent loss and, in many cases, disastrous consequences.
It is not uncommon in Philadelphia County for a year or eighteen
months to elapse from the time of ordering a case upon the trial
list until it appears thereon for the first time. And usually from
six months to a year more elapse before there is an opportunity
for trial. It is submitted that this situation would be greatly
alleviated by the establishment of separate machinery for the
trial of cases arising out of automobile accidents, just as the
workmen's compensation laws relieved the courts of a great
volume of litigation between employer and employed.
